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INTRODUCTION 
The twenty-fifth anniversary of Batson v. Kentucky1 provides an important 
moment to reflect on Batson and to consider how this seminal case and its 
progeny2 have affected the use and abuse of peremptory challenges. I had 
initially welcomed the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to peremptory 
challenges in Batson back in 1986. Although Batson was a compromise3—
preserving peremptories while seeking to address discriminatory 
peremptories—it had the noble goal of trying to eliminate discrimination 
during jury selection. I also embraced its expansion over the years. The logic 
of Batson was inexorable: just as prosecutors should not be permitted to use 
peremptories to eliminate African Americans as jurors, so too, defense 
attorneys4 and civil parties5 should be similarly constrained. Just as African 
Americans should not be subjected to discriminatory peremptories, so too, 
members of any race,6 ethnicity,7 or gender8 should not be subjected to 
discriminatory peremptories. However, over time I developed serious doubts 
that Batson and its progeny could achieve their central goal of eliminating 
discrimination during jury selection.9 Now, with twenty-five years of 
experience, we can look back and see just how ineffective Batson has been. 
This anniversary is an appropriate juncture to renew the call for the 
elimination of the peremptory challenge, echoing Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s recommendation in his Batson concurrence twenty-five years 
ago.10 
 
 1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor’s use of a 
peremptory challenge based on race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). 
 2. See infra notes 4–6, 8, 16 (describing the cases that expanded the reach of Batson). 
 3. Batson, 476 U.S. at 126–27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (describing Batson as a “curious 
hybrid”). 
 4. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson to defense 
attorneys). 
 5. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (extending Batson 
to civil parties). 
 6. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that a Batson challenge can be 
made by a defendant of any race whenever the prosecutor exercises a peremptory based on 
race). 
 7. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (noting that a Batson challenge 
can be made on the basis of ethnicity, but finding that in this case the prosecutor’s reasons for 
exercising peremptories against two Latino prospective jurors were race neutral). 
 8. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that gender-based 
peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 9. See Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. 
L. REV. 1041 (1995) [hereinafter Marder, Beyond Gender]; Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the 
Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683 (2006) [hereinafter Marder, The 
Peremptory Challenge]. 
 10. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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This anniversary prompts not only a reassessment of why Batson has 
been so ineffective over the course of twenty-five years, but also a 
reexamination of what any of us—lawyers, judges, and prospective jurors—
can determine about individual juror bias before the start of the trial (other 
than the most clear-cut cases for which a for-cause challenge is appropriate). 
At some point during voir dire, judges typically ask prospective jurors 
whether they can be impartial.11 If they say that they can be, then they are 
free to serve. The only barrier to their service is the lawyer who distrusts 
their response and removes them through the exercise of a peremptory 
challenge. But this assumes that a lawyer can recognize individual juror bias, 
and this assumption is based on anecdotal evidence, which is undermined by 
empirical studies. 
England, which has eliminated the peremptory challenge,12 offers 
another theory of juror bias. English barristers and judges explain that 
jurors will rise to the occasion and put aside their biases and perform their 
role as impartial jurors. When questioned about this, they suggest that most 
jurors can serve because they take their responsibilities seriously and will 
step into their role as “impartial jurors.”13 
An alternative theory of juror bias, which I call the “process theory,” is 
that various stages of the jury process will help jurors to perform their role 
impartially even if they began the trial with biases that the juror, judge, or 
lawyers failed to identify. For example, the voir dire, oath, instructions, and 
deliberations (particularly with a diverse jury) help jurors to put aside their 
biases and to perform their role as impartial jurors. According to this theory, 
peremptories, which limit the diversity of the jury, make it more difficult for 
jurors to challenge each other during deliberations, and therefore, make 
deliberations less of an institutional constraint on juror bias. 
Under both the English and the process theories, peremptories do not 
play a constructive role and should be eliminated. The elimination of 
peremptories in England also suggests that peremptories are not inevitable, 
even in a jury system that has had a tradition of peremptories, as England 
has had and the United States still has. Moreover, peremptories are harmful 
 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, No. 77 Cr. 680 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1980) [hereinafter 
Trial Transcript] (including a transcript of the jury selection); id. at 70–71, 74, 77, 79, 83, 89, 
91, 96, 98 (providing instances when Federal District Court Judge Knapp asked prospective 
jurors if they could be impartial, and when they said they could be, they were not removed for 
cause). 
 12. As a result of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, which took effect on January 5, 1989, 
criminal defendants in England no longer exercise peremptory challenges, see Criminal Justice 
Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118(1) (Eng. & Wales), and the Crown does not generally exercise stand-bys 
(in which the Crown can reserve judgment on a prospective juror until all other prospective 
jurors are considered), except in “a small number of cases.” John F. McEldowney, “Stand By for 
the Crown”: An Historical Analysis, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 272, 281 (quoting the Attorney-General). 
 13. See Nancy S. Marder, Two Weeks at the Old Bailey: Jury Lessons from England, 86 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 537, 553 (2011). 
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to the jury system. As twenty-five years of Batson have shown, peremptories 
can limit African Americans’ opportunities to serve as jurors and skew the 
composition of the jury, particularly in capital cases.14 Peremptories make it 
more difficult to achieve juries that reflect a fair cross section of the 
community. 
This twenty-fifth anniversary gives us an opportunity to rethink the 
theory and practice of peremptory challenges under Batson. Toward this 
end, Part I will offer three explanations as to why Batson has been so 
ineffective in practice. Part II will critique the American theory of juror bias, 
which assumes that lawyers can discern juror bias and that lawyers will 
exercise peremptories to eliminate so-called biased jurors. Part III will look 
at the English theory of juror bias, which assumes that jurors will rise to the 
demands of their role and be impartial. Under this theory, peremptories are 
no longer needed. It will also look at the process theory and consider how 
peremptories undermine the effectiveness of jury deliberations. Finally, Part 
IV will examine the ways in which we should revise our own jury-trial 
practice by eliminating peremptory challenges to reflect the difficulty of 
identifying individual juror bias and militate against the harms that 
peremptories cause. Even if peremptories are eliminated, for-cause 
challenges and voir dire should remain. For-cause challenges exclude jurors 
who say they cannot be impartial, and voir dire serves other, albeit 
unacknowledged, functions, such as transforming summoned citizens into 
responsible jurors and providing the first step, according to the process 
theory, of educating jurors about the need to be impartial. 
I.  EXAMINING BATSON’S INEFFECTIVENESS 
There are at least three reasons why Batson has been so ineffective over 
the past twenty-five years. First, lawyers quickly learned which reasons to give 
and which ones to eschew when they were challenged on the exercise of a 
peremptory challenge. Second, trial judges are reluctant to find Batson 
violations, and appellate courts are extremely deferential to trial courts 
when reviewing Batson challenges. Third, whatever force Batson might have 
had was undermined by Purkett v. Elem, a per curiam opinion by the 
Supreme Court.15 
 
 14. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION:  
A CONTINUING LEGACY 5 (2010), http://s3.amazonaws.com/nytdocs/docs/368/368.pdf 
[hereinafter EJI REPORT] (“Racially biased use of peremptory strikes and illegal racial 
discrimination in jury selection remains widespread, particularly in serious criminal cases and 
capital cases.”); Henry R. Chalmers, A Long Way to Go: Report Finds Lingering, Hard-to-Eradicate 
Discrimination in Jury Selection, LITIG. NEWS, Fall 2010, at 6, 7 (“In death penalty cases from 2005 
to 2009 in one Alabama county, prosecutors used peremptory strikes to remove 80 percent of 
the qualified African Americans in the jury venires, according to the [EJI] report.”). 
 15. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that it is not until the 
third step of the three-step test that a trial court determines whether the opponent of a 
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A. GIVING REASONS 
As part of the Batson compromise, the Supreme Court established a 
three-step test for a defense attorney who sought to challenge a prosecutor’s 
exercise of a peremptory against an African American prospective juror.16 
Even after Batson, prosecutors and defense attorneys typically exercised their 
peremptory challenges without having to give a reason. However, if the 
defendant was African American and the defense attorney suspected that 
the prosecutor had exercised a peremptory to exclude an African American 
from the jury, the defense attorney could object and raise a Batson 
challenge.17 Then, outside of the presence of the jury, either at a sidebar or 
in a separate hearing, the defense attorney could try to establish a prima 
facie case that the prosecutor had exercised a peremptory against a 
prospective juror because that person was African American, that 
peremptories permit discrimination by those “who are of a mind to 
discriminate,” and that these and other facts raise an inference of 
purposeful discrimination.18 If the defense attorney succeeded in 
establishing a “prima facie case of purposeful discrimination” (step one),19 
then the prosecutor had to give a reason for the peremptory (step two) that 
was related to the case at hand.20 Finally, the judge then had to decide 
whether the reason was pretextual (step three).21 If it was pretextual, then 
the court would not permit the peremptory; if it was race-neutral, then the 
court would permit it. 
One reason Batson was so ineffectual was that lawyers quickly learned 
which reasons to give and which ones to avoid. The only guidance the 
Supreme Court provided in Batson was that any reason should be “related to 
 
peremptory strike has met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination, and that the reason 
given by the proponent of the strike at step two can be silly as long as it is race neutral). 
 16. The Batson test initially applied just to the defense’s challenge of the prosecutor’s 
peremptories in instances where the defendant was African American and the prosecutor 
sought to exclude African American prospective jurors from the petit jury. However, after 
subsequent cases, including Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (all of which I refer to as “the Batson progeny”), the test became 
applicable to defense attorneys and civil parties and prohibited all parties of any race, gender, 
or ethnicity from using peremptories to exclude jurors based on these characteristics. 
 17. However, in some states in the South, defense attorneys are unlikely to make a Batson 
challenge because they know that the judge is unlikely to grant it. See, e.g., Chalmers, supra note 
14, at 8 (“For example, the [EJI] report highlights the fact that no criminal defendant has 
successfully raised a Batson challenge in Tennessee and that no successful Batson challenge has 
occurred in South Carolina since 1992.”). 
 18. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 
562 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 98. 
 21. Id. 
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the particular case to be tried”22 and not so vague as to constitute a 
“hunch.”23 Otherwise, it was up to trial judges to decide which reasons were 
acceptable. Prosecutors quickly learned not to say that they had exercised a 
peremptory based on the race of the prospective juror. Rather, they could 
give fact-specific reasons, such as the prospective juror stared,24 hesitated 
before responding,25 or failed to make eye contact.26 In some courtrooms, 
they could say that the prospective juror lived in a neighborhood where 
there was a lot of drug activity and the case involved drugs.27 They could also 
exclude prospective jurors because of their professions,28 clothing,29 or the 
way they wore their hair.30 As these reasons suggest, almost any reason that is 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (“Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant’s case merely by denying that he 
had a discriminatory motive or ‘affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections.’” 
(quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)) (alterations in original)). 
 24. See United States v. Ferguson, No. 92-5571, No. 92-5587, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22373, at *9–10 (4th Cir. Sept. 1, 1993) (holding that the prosecutor’s reasons for exercising a 
peremptory against an African American juror who “stared” at the prosecutor and might have 
difficulty with the complexities of the case were acceptable reasons). 
 25. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 356 (1991) (“I didn’t feel, when I asked 
[these two jurors] whether or not they could accept the interpreter’s translation of it, I didn’t 
feel that they could. They each looked away from me and said with some hesitancy that they 
would try, not that they could . . . .” (quoting the prosecutor) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 26. Id. at 357 n.1 (“I just felt from the hesitancy in [the jurors’] answers and their lack of 
eye contact that they would not be able to do it.” (quoting the prosecutor) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 96-4002, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16315, at *4–5 
(4th Cir. July 3, 1997) (holding that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against an African 
American female juror in a drug case “because she lived in a neighborhood known for drug 
trafficking activities and that during questioning she stared coldly at the prosecutor” constituted 
“an adequate, race-neutral reason for striking the juror”); United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 
388, 393 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting as “race-neutral on its face” the government’s explanation 
that it exercised a peremptory challenge against an African American female juror “because of 
[her] likely place of residence, she was more likely to have had direct exposure to a drug 
trafficking situation than other potential jurors as a class”). But see United States v. Bishop, 959 
F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 1992) (“While residence may sometimes be a valid reason for a 
challenge, in this case the prosecutor’s invocation of residence rested on a stereotypical racial 
reason. As a result, we cannot find that race was not a factor in his decision.”).  
 28. See, e.g., United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that a prosecutor’s reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against the only African 
American woman on the jury because of her age, number of children, and profession 
(computer analyst) were race neutral and not a pretext for racial bias). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 322–23, 325 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that a prosecutor’s reason for exercising a peremptory challenge against an African 
American man because he dressed “like a rock star” was race neutral (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 30. See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995) (“I struck [juror] number twenty-
two because of his long hair. He had long curly hair. . . . And juror number twenty-four also has 
a mustache and goatee type beard. . . . And I don’t like the way they looked, with the way the 
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not explicitly about race will suffice. One judge made this point clear by 
compiling a list, supported by Illinois case law, that he thought prosecutors 
could distribute under the title “‘Handy Race-Neutral Explanations’ or ‘20 
Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations,’” which included such offerings as 
“too old, too young, divorced, ‘long, unkempt hair,’ free-lance writer, 
religion, social worker, renter, lack of family contact, attempting to make 
eye-contact with defendant, ‘lived in an area consisting predominantly of 
apartment complexes,’ single, [and] over-educated.”31 The EJI report is 
replete with examples of reasons that trial judges in the South have found to 
be race neutral, including the “low intelligence” of African American 
prospective jurors.32 
Prosecutors just had to be careful not to give a reason that also applied 
to a white juror against whom they did not exercise a peremptory. For 
example, if they exercised a peremptory against a Latino prospective juror 
because he was from a certain city, then they had to be careful that they did 
not accept a white juror from that same city.33 Otherwise, as long as they 
gave a reason that did not explicitly involve race, the judge usually found it 
to be race neutral. 
As an indication that lawyers learned quickly which reasons to give and 
which ones to avoid, consider United States v. Omoruyi,34 which was decided in 
1993, seven years after Batson, but one year before J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B.35 At that point, the juror’s race was an impermissible reason for 
exercising a peremptory and excluding that juror, but the juror’s gender was 
still a permissible reason.36 When the prosecutor exercised a peremptory 
against an African American female juror, he explained that he did so not 
because she was African American, but because she was female.37 He said 
that he excluded her “[b]ecause she was a single female and my concern, 
frankly, is that she, like the other juror I struck, is single and given 
defendant’s good looks would be attracted to the defendant.”38 After J.E.B., 
lawyers would no longer say that they had exercised a peremptory because of 
a juror’s gender; rather, they would give some other reason. Again, the more 
fact-specific the reason, the more difficult it would be to challenge. 
 
hair is cut, both of them.” (alteration in original) (quoting the prosecutor) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 31. People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65–66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (footnotes omitted). 
 32. EJI REPORT, supra note 14, at 17–18, 24–27, 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The 
government stated that it rejected juror Osuna due to his residence (La Mesa) . . . . However, 
another unchallenged juror lived in La Mesa.”).  
 34. United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 35. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 36. See id. at 129. 
 37. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d at 881. 
 38. Id. (internal quotation marks and bold typeface omitted).  
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B.  BEING DEFERENTIAL 
Another reason that Batson and its progeny have been so ineffective is 
that trial judges are reluctant to find Batson violations, and appellate judges 
are deferential to trial judges’ determinations. 
Trial judges could undertake a more searching inquiry of the reasons a 
party gives to justify a challenged peremptory, and some do.39 But since the 
reason only has to be race neutral, and since a more searching inquiry 
entails questioning the credibility of a prosecutor (or the party explaining 
the exercise of the peremptory), many trial judges accept the reason as 
permissible. One writer explained that trial judges are reluctant to 
undertake too searching an inquiry because they do not want to impugn the 
integrity of the prosecutor, an officer of the court.40 Once the prosecutor 
has given a reason that is acceptable on its face, the trial judge is inclined to 
accept it. If the trial judge scrutinizes the reason further, it would be as if the 
trial judge did not believe the prosecutor and were essentially calling the 
prosecutor a liar. 
Appellate courts also have reason to be deferential to the trial judge’s 
finding in a Batson challenge because the trial judge sees the lawyers and 
jurors in the courtroom, whereas the appellate court has only the cold, hard 
transcript before it. The appellate courts’ deference makes sense particularly 
when so many of the reasons are fact-specific and often depend on the body 
language of the participants. It is difficult for an appellate court to gauge 
whether a prospective juror made eye contact or failed to make eye contact. 
As one appellate court explained: “Since the district court’s determination 
of whether a peremptory challenge constituted purposeful discrimination 
turns on an evaluation of credibility of the prosecutor’s explanation, we 
should give those findings great deference.”41 Although one academic 
suggested that Batson hearings could be filmed so that the appellate court 
would be able to watch the jury selection and see what the trial judge saw, 
this procedure has not yet been tried.42 In fact, in one pilot program in 
which appellate judges were able to watch a video of trial court proceedings 
 
 39. See supra note 27 (citing two cases that found place of residence to be race neutral and 
another case that found place of residence to rely on race-based stereotypes). 
 40. See, e.g., Chalmers, supra note 14, at 7 (identifying “judges’ hesitancy to call 
prosecutors liars” as one reason discriminatory peremptories continue unabated). 
 41. United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 697–98 (9th Cir. 1989). Interestingly, in 
Chinchilla, the appellate court, while acknowledging the need to treat the trial judge’s findings 
with deference, did undertake a more searching inquiry of the prosecutor’s reasons and did 
find that two peremptories—one exercised against a Latino prospective juror and one against a 
Latino alternate juror—were prohibited because they were based on race. Id. at 697–99. 
 42. See Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 95 (2008). 
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(though not a Batson hearing) as the basis for their review, they preferred 
the transcript to the video because the video took more time to view.43 
The appellate courts recognize that they are called upon to review 
determinations that the trial judge is in a better position to make and so 
they proceed with deference. The Seventh Circuit provides an example of 
this tendency. Between 1986 and 2005, the Seventh Circuit reviewed forty-
two Batson challenges in which they published opinions that appeared in a 
LEXIS database.44 In an earlier article, I reported that in thirty-four of these 
cases (eighty-one percent), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the 
district-court judge on the Batson challenge.45 Of the eight cases that were 
not affirmed, five cases involved unusual procedures by the trial judge, one 
case was remanded for the prosecutor to give reasons, and two cases were 
before the Seventh Circuit on collateral review and the law had changed 
since the earlier rulings.46 The Seventh Circuit explained that deference was 
appropriate because the trial judge is in the best position to make factual 
findings.47 The Seventh Circuit admitted that it would accept a trial judge’s 
rulings in Batson challenges unless they were “completely outlandish” or 
their “falsity” was readily apparent.48 Thus, trial judges have little to worry 
about when it comes to appellate review of Batson challenges. 
C.  EVISCERATING BATSON 
Given lawyers’ awareness of which reasons to avoid and trial and 
appellate courts’ deference, Batson was hardly a barrier to discriminatory 
peremptories, and Elem weakened Batson even further.49 In this per curiam 
opinion, decided without the benefit of full briefing and oral argument,50 
the Supreme Court concluded that at step two of the three-step test, a party 
can offer any reason at all—no matter how “silly or superstitious”—as long as 
it is race neutral.51 
The reason does not even have to be related to the case, as Batson had 
required.52 At step three, the judge must decide whether the “silly or 
 
 43. Memorandum from John Shapard on the Evaluation of Experimental Videotaping of 
Court Proceedings to the Judicial Conference Comm. on Court Admin. & Case Mgmt.  
(May 25, 1993), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/8763522/Evaluation-of-Videotape-
Experiment (“By far the most common objection to videotape [by federal appellate judges] was 
that it is much more time consuming to review a videotape than a transcript.”). 
 44. Marder, The Peremptory Challenge, supra note 9, at 1708. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1708–09. 
 47. Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 48. Id. (quoting United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir.), modified, 136 
F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
 49. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam). 
 50. Id. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 768 (per curiam). 
 52. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). 
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superstitious reason” is pretextual.53 As long as the reason is race neutral, 
even if it is downright silly, it has now met the requirement of Batson. 
The reasons the prosecutor gave in Elem to explain his peremptories 
were unrelated to the case at hand. The case involved a robbery. Elem 
objected to the prosecutor’s use of peremptories to exclude two African 
American men from the jury. As soon as Elem made his objections, the 
prosecutor simply gave his reasons without waiting for Elem to establish a 
prima facie case. The prosecutor explained that he struck both jurors 
because of their hair. One had “long hair” and the other had a “mustache 
and a goatee type beard.”54 He added that he did not “like the way they 
looked” and that their hair “look[ed] suspicious” to him.55 The trial judge 
overruled Elem’s objections and empaneled the jury, and the jury convicted. 
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge’s ruling 
on the Batson challenge, but the Eighth Circuit reversed as to the first juror, 
explaining that Batson required “some plausible race-neutral reason for 
believing those factors will somehow affect the person’s ability to perform 
his or her duties as a juror.”56 
In Elem, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and 
undermined Batson in at least two ways. First, it established that the reason a 
party gives for exercising a peremptory does not have to be related to the 
case.57 This was a departure from Batson, as Justice Stevens noted in his 
dissent.58 This departure means that the reasons can be fanciful or silly, as 
long as they are race neutral. If the prosecutor said that he excluded a juror 
because he was wearing a green shirt, it would not matter that green shirts 
have no bearing on the case. 
Second, the Supreme Court tried to distinguish between fanciful or silly 
reasons and how judges should assess them at step two and step three of the 
test.59 Such reasons can now be given at step two, but then at step three the 
judge must decide whether they are pretextual or not. For example, at step 
three, the judge must decide whether green shirts are pretextual, but unless 
all of the African American jurors are wearing green shirts, the judge would 
find that this reason, though silly, is race neutral, and therefore, not 
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Before Elem, the Supreme Court 
 
 53. Elem, 514 U.S. at 768. 
 54. Id. at 766 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 
 55. Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 
 56. Id. at 767 (quoting Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (1994)). The Eighth Circuit 
agreed with the State that excluding the second juror was not an error because “that juror’s 
status as a former victim of a robbery was related to the case at hand.” Id. at 773. At trial, the 
prosecutor had explained that the second juror had been the victim of a robbery with a shotgun 
and might assume that guns were necessary to robberies. Id. at 766.  
 57. See id. at 768–69.  
 58. Id. at 777–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 768 (per curiam). 
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would have rejected the reason because it was unrelated to the case and 
would have prohibited the peremptory. As Justice Stevens explained: 
“[P]reoccupation with the niceties of a three-step analysis should not 
foreclose meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial explanations that are 
entirely unrelated to the case to be tried.”60 Indeed, having long hair or 
facial hair, just like wearing a green shirt, had nothing to do with the case; 
yet, this irrelevant reason can now be the basis for a juror’s exclusion from 
the jury. Batson had said that a prosecutor could not exclude a juror based 
on a “hunch,” but this is exactly what the Supreme Court now permits under 
Elem. If Batson encouraged a charade, Elem created a farce. 
II.  REASSESSING THE AMERICAN THEORY OF JUROR BIAS 
The main justification for the peremptory challenge is that it allows a 
lawyer to remove a prospective juror who the lawyer thinks will not be 
impartial, even though the judge did not remove the juror for cause.61 
There are other justifications for peremptory challenges, some of which are 
legitimate, such as they allow the defendant to feel comfortable with his jury, 
and some of which are illegitimate, such as they allow lawyers to make 
examples of certain jurors during voir dire and then remove them with their 
peremptories.62 Lawyers also claim that peremptories give them some 
control over the selection of the jury, without requiring them to depend 
wholly upon the judge.63 Many lawyers also believe that peremptories allow 
them to remove the one crazy juror whom the judge will not remove for 
cause. But the main justification for the peremptory, which is to remove 
jurors who cannot be impartial, depends upon lawyers’ ability to identify 
such jurors. Can lawyers do this? They say that they can, and the American 
theory of juror bias assumes that they can, but the evidence is anecdotal, and 
empirical studies suggest otherwise. 
The voir dire, or questioning of jurors, is designed to provide the judge 
and lawyers with the information they need to remove jurors (whether with a 
for-cause challenge or a peremptory challenge) who cannot be impartial. 
One difficulty is that the questions, at least in federal court, tend to be quite 
cursory and to produce limited information.64 Jurors are typically asked 
where they reside, the nature of their work, their marital status, what their 
 
 60. Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 61. See, e.g., SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 50–52 (1988). 
 62. See id. at 50. 
 63. See, e.g., Marder, Beyond Gender, supra note 9, at 1086–88 (identifying several benefits 
of peremptory challenges, including that they allow parties to feel that they have exercised 
some control over jury selection and that they believe the jury will be fair). 
 64. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 545, 549 (1975) (“[T]he limited questions put by the judge to the panel as a group greatly 
reduce the information produced by the voir dire.”). 
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spouse does, whether they have any children, what their children do, and 
whether they can be impartial.65 As long as jurors say that they can be 
impartial, the judge will not remove them for cause. In the first instance, the 
judge and lawyers depend on the jurors’ self-assessment to decide whether 
they can be impartial. Yet, it is difficult for jurors to recognize bias in 
themselves,66 and even if they do, it is difficult for them to bring it to the 
attention of the judge, an authority figure whom they want to please.67 
The voir dire is conducted in the public setting of the courtroom and 
jurors are usually questioned as a group. It is undoubtedly difficult to be 
reflective in such a setting and to ask oneself if one can truly be impartial. It 
is also exceedingly difficult for a juror to admit in that public setting that he 
or she cannot be impartial. The socially acceptable, or what psychologists 
describe as “socially desirable,” answer is that one can be impartial.68 It is far 
easier to remain silent69 and to blend in with the group70 than to respond in 
a manner that is contrary to social expectations. 
Lawyers believe that they can detect bias even when jurors are not able 
to admit it to themselves or others. However, there is no evidence that 
lawyers can do this. Alan Dershowitz, a law professor and trial lawyer, has 
acknowledged the difficulty of this task: “Lawyers’ instincts are often the least 
trustworthy basis on which to pick jurors. All those neat rules of thumb, but 
no feedback. Ten years of accumulated experiences may be 10 years of 
 
 65. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 69–101. 
 66. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, When All of Us Are Victims: Juror Prejudice and “Terrorist” Trials, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1143, 1149 (2003) (noting that psychological research on jurors suggests 
that jurors may not recognize their own prejudices).  
 67. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? 
Other Ways To Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1194 
(2003) (“The judge’s approval is important to a lot of prospective jurors and many will alter 
their responses or hide certain attitudes in order to be perceived favorably.”); Vidmar, supra 
note 66, at 1150 (“The tendency to provide such [‘socially desirable’] answers can be enhanced 
by the authoritative presence of the judge.”).  
 68. Vidmar, supra note 66, at 1150. 
 69. See, e.g., Richard Seltzer et al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 451, 
455 (1991) (describing a study of thirty-one criminal trials in D.C. in which researchers 
observed voir dire, conducted follow-up interviews, and analyzed data). The study found that 
about half the prospective jurors who had been victims of crime did not come forward during 
voir dire when they should have. Id. at 456 (finding under-reporting by about thirty percent of 
prospective jurors who had a connection with law enforcement and did not reveal it when 
questioned about it during voir dire). 
 70. Judge Mize, who added an individual voir dire to the group voir dire when he was a 
judge, found that the main advantage of an individual voir dire was that jurors could no longer 
remain silent as they had during the group voir dire. See Gregory E. Mize, On Better Jury Selection: 
Spotting UFO Jurors Before They Enter the Jury Room, CT. REV., Spring 1999, at 10. Once jurors had 
to respond to questions, they were forthcoming with information, and oftentimes this 
information led to for-cause dismissal. Id. at 12. Judge Kimba Wood also found that jurors were 
likely to be more forthcoming in the privacy of the judge’s robing room than in the public 
setting of the courtroom. See Kimba M. Wood, The 1995 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture: Reexamining 
the Access Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1118–20 (1996). 
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being wrong.”71 A team of researchers who conducted an empirical study of 
attorneys’ and judges’ exercise of challenges described the problem as 
follows: 
Those charged with making juror selection decisions receive little 
formal training for the task. What little training is provided is 
largely anecdotal or based on folklore or stereotypes. Further, even 
if there were reliable clues to juror bias, one cannot very effectively 
‘learn on the job,’ largely because there is no effective feedback of 
how good one’s decisions have been. Judges and attorneys never 
know how those they have challenged would have decided the case 
had they been seated as jurors.72 
Empirical studies do not support lawyers’ contention that they can 
detect bias or discern which jurors are sympathetic to their case, which is 
what they really want to do,73 even though they claim to want an impartial 
jury. In one of the few studies to examine the effectiveness of peremptory 
challenges, Hans Zeisel and Shari Diamond made use of two “shadow 
juries,” one consisting of those who had been dismissed through peremptory 
challenges and one consisting of randomly selected members of the venire.74 
They attempted to reconstruct the juries as they would have existed if 
peremptories had not been used. They found that seven of the twelve juries 
were only minimally affected by the use of peremptory challenges.75 They 
concluded that prosecutors, and to a lesser extent defense attorneys, were 
unable to use their peremptories to any advantage and that the “collective 
performance of the attorneys [was] not impressive.”76 
In a study using mock jurors, researchers showed prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges a taped voir dire and asked them which jurors they 
would have excused.77 The researchers found that those who were excused 
“were no more or no less likely to convict than those who were acceptable to 
 
 71. Morton Hunt, Putting Juries on the Couch, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 
70, 82. 
 72. Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial 
Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 699 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
 73. See, e.g., KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 61, at 50 (“[I]t is no secret that [trial 
lawyers] strive to obtain not an impartial panel, but a sympathetic one.”); JAMES P. LEVINE, 
JURIES AND POLITICS 51 (1992) (“The use of peremptory challenges is supposed to eliminate 
people who are biased and leave a batch of open-minded jurors. But lawyers use their 
prerogatives to try to accomplish just the opposite—a jury packed with sympathizers or at least 
devoid of antagonists.”). 
 74. Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and 
Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 498–99 (1978). 
 75. Id. at 507. 
 76. Id. at 517. 
 77. See Norbert L. Kerr, The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors, 78 JUDICATURE 120, 126 
(1994). See generally Kerr et al., supra note 72.  
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judges and defense attorneys.”78 Although attorneys thought that they would 
be correct in their predictions 71.9% of the time as to how prospective 
jurors would vote, in fact they were correct only 45.4% of the time.79 They 
did “about as well as one might do by flipping a coin.”80 
In three other experiments, another group of researchers learned that 
trial lawyers tended to rely on two or three characteristics in deciding 
whether a juror would be biased.81 In the first experiment, the researchers 
looked at the type of juror characteristics that lawyers said they sought and 
found some agreement among lawyers about which ones indicated bias.82 In 
the second experiment, the researchers found that the lawyers’ use of these 
characteristics was no more sophisticated than the reasoning used by college 
sophomores when asked to select jurors.83 Finally, in the third experiment, 
trial lawyers and law students, when asked which jurors to accept or reject, 
showed the same pattern of error: “Both attorneys and students made more 
incorrect acceptance and rejection choices than corresponding correct 
choices . . . .”84 
Although there are a few tools that could aid lawyers in detecting juror 
bias, they are not used as a matter of course during voir dire, at least not yet. 
For example, in a few courtrooms, the judge conducts an individual voir dire 
in addition to a group voir dire.85 In the more intimate setting of the judge’s 
robing-room, when the juror meets face-to-face with the lawyers and judge 
and when the juror must, in fact, respond to questions and not hide in 
silence, there might be a greater chance that the juror will acknowledge his 
or her own bias in a particular case.86 However, most judges are unwilling to 
add individual voir dire because they are concerned about making jury 
selection more time-consuming than it already is. 
Another potential tool is having jurors respond to questions both orally 
and in writing. Judges sometimes agree to allow jurors to complete a written 
 
 78. Kerr, supra note 77, at 126. 
 79. Id.; Kerr et al., supra note 72, at 689. 
 80. Kerr, supra note 77, at 126; see Kerr et al., supra note 72, at 685 (“Thus, in identifying 
jurors hostile to their cases, defense attorneys would have done no worse in exercising their 
peremptory challenges had they simply flipped coins rather than analyzing the responses jurors 
made to questions about their exposure to pretrial publicity.”). 
 81. Paul V. Olczak et al., Attorneys’ Lay Psychology and its Effectiveness in Selecting Jurors: Three 
Empirical Studies, 6 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 431, 438 (1991) (indicating that lawyers have 
“a tendency to emphasize only a few characteristics when forming judgments of bias”). 
 82. Id. at 435, 440. 
 83. Id. at 442. The authors concluded that “not only is jury selection by attorneys an art, 
but it is a lay art.” Id. at 443. 
 84. Id. at 446. 
 85. See Mize, supra note 70, at 10. 
 86. See id. at 15 (“I am convinced that even if individual questioning took up significant 
amounts of time (which it has not for me), it would be well worth expending the effort in order 
to avoid juror UFO’s and the consequent danger of mistrials caused by impaneling biased or 
disabled citizens.”). 
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questionnaire prior to oral questioning. If the questionnaire is well 
designed, it will ask the same question in more than one way.87 Inconsistent 
responses may reveal a bias that the juror was unaware of or unable to admit 
to during the in-court voir dire. However, the written questionnaire is 
usually reserved for high-profile cases where there has been extensive 
pretrial publicity. In such cases, the lawyers and judge need to gauge how 
much jurors have heard about the case beforehand and whether they can 
judge the case based only on the evidence presented in the courtroom. 
Finally, the Internet presents a potential tool for lawyers seeking to uncover 
juror bias. With the Internet, lawyers have access to new sources of 
information about jurors so that even if jurors do not respond fully during 
voir dire, a more complete and candid picture of them can emerge from 
their Internet activity.88 But this is still uncharted territory for most lawyers, 
and many jurors still remain “off the grid.” 
Even though voir dire is supposed to help judges and lawyers exclude 
jurors who cannot be impartial, it is conducted in ways that make it 
exceedingly difficult for them to detect bias.89 Judges are usually satisfied 
once jurors have said in open court that they can be impartial. Lawyers are 
usually satisfied once they have exercised their peremptories. However, 
these steps, though they might reassure judges, lawyers, and parties that 
biased jurors have been removed, have not proven to be effective. Self-
assessment is difficult for jurors, yet judges rely on it.90 Peremptories are 
difficult to exercise meaningfully, yet lawyers rely on them. The empirical 
studies suggest that we adhere to traditions such as peremptories based on 
the belief that lawyers can recognize individual jurors who are biased and 
remove them from the jury, even though this is not so. One response to this 
dilemma is to try to improve the voir dire process so that it is more likely to 
 
 87. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 66, at 1168–69 (describing survey data that were collected 
by questionnaire and interviews to explore the effects of pretrial publicity in a then-upcoming 
terrorist trial, and finding that respondents who said they could be impartial in response to 
some questions answered other questions in a way that indicated bias). 
 88. See, e.g., Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Jurors in the Digital Age, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 33) (“The major concern surrounding juror privacy is the 
enhanced ability to learn information about jurors on the Internet. While some see this as an 
intrusion into the personal life of jurors, others believe that attorneys, like everyone else, should 
be able to obtain information about jurors, especially when such information is in the public 
domain.” (footnote omitted)). 
 89. See, e.g., Hans & Jehle, supra note 67, at 1201 (“In summary, the typical voir dire as it is 
currently conducted is often inadequate for detecting the biases of prospective jurors in 
criminal and civil trials.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Kerr et al., supra note 72, at 690 (finding in one empirical study that “the self-
reports [of juror bias] were unrelated to the jurors’ later verdicts. . . [and] those who admitted 
having formed an opinion from pretrial publicity that they could not set aside were no more or 
less likely to convict the defendant than those who reported no such fixed bias”).  
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reveal juror bias.91 Another response is to realize that we cannot detect juror 
bias given the current process and so we need to reexamine our views on 
juror bias. 
III.  EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF JUROR BIAS 
A.  THE ENGLISH THEORY 
A number of English judges and barristers have espoused a theory of 
juror bias that differs from the American theory. According to the English 
theory, citizens are summoned to serve as jurors and when they assume the 
role, they will put aside their individual biases and serve as impartial jurors.92 
If one takes this view, then all citizens, except those with a for-cause reason, 
can serve on the jury. Peremptories become unnecessary, and indeed, the 
English have eliminated them.93 
In the two weeks that I observed jury trials at the Old Bailey in 
London,94 it became clear to me that the English theory of juror bias leads 
to a very different process of jury selection than the one found in American 
courtrooms. To begin with, jury selection proceeds very quickly. In one case 
of fraud, for example, the clerk randomly selected twelve names, and as each 
name was called the person answered “yes” and took his or her place in the 
jury box.95 The judge asked the jurors if any of them worked for Customs 
and Revenue because the case involved that agency.96 No juror did.97 The 
judge then asked the jurors if any of them knew the barristers.98 Again, no 
juror did. Each juror then read an oath or affirmation (after having selected 
the relevant holy book). When one juror had difficulty reading the oath, 
that juror was dismissed because the case involved many documents that the 
jurors would need to read. Another juror was seated and sworn in, and the 
trial was ready to proceed. 
The entire jury selection was completed in a matter of minutes. The 
jury that was seated was diverse. The jury consisted of five men and seven 
women.99 Of the twelve jurors, seven were white, four were black, and one 
 
 91. See, e.g., Hans & Jehle, supra note 67, at 1201 (“By expanding the use of 
questionnaires, modifying the questioning method and content, and allowing direct attorney 
participation, the courts could create a more effective voir dire.”). 
 92. My observations and interviews were the result of two weeks (Dec. 7– 22, 2010) that I 
spent observing jury trials at the Old Bailey in London. I have recounted my findings more fully 
in an earlier article. See Marder, supra note 13, at 554 passim.  
 93. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118(1) (Eng. & Wales). 
 94. See Marder, supra note 13, at 537 n.1. 
 95. See id. at 552 (describing jury selection in R v. Ilene (Old Bailey, London, Dec. 2010)). 
 96. Id. If the case had involved police witnesses, then the jurors would have been asked if 
any of them worked in law enforcement. Id. at 552 n.45. 
 97. Id. at 552. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
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was of South Asian ancestry.100 Although not every jury will necessarily be 
diverse, English juries are more likely than American juries to be diverse 
because there is random selection without the skewing produced by 
peremptories. Indeed, one of the reasons the English eliminated 
peremptories and limited stand-bys101 was so that the jury would reflect more 
closely the heterogeneity of English society.102 As one report in the United 
Kingdom explained: “A jury should represent a cross-section drawn at 
random from the community, and should be the means of bringing to bear 
on the issues the corporate good sense of that community.”103 
What was interesting in this case was how little the barristers knew about 
the jurors. The only information they had was what they could gather from 
the jurors’ appearance (gender, race, and possibly age) and what they could 
glean from their choice of holy book or affirmation (Christian, Muslim, and 
non-observant) for their oath. Yet, the absence of background information 
did not leave them doubting the impartiality of the jurors. Instead, they 
assumed that all the jurors would play their proper role and put aside any 
individual prejudices they might hold. This was their role, and they were 
expected to perform it. The defendant was entitled to twelve impartial jurors 
and the expectation was that these twelve individuals, once they were sworn 
in as jurors, would assume their proper role. As one barrister had explained 
to another researcher: “I happen to take the view that whatever one’s 
personal prejudices, the chances are that a juror called to jury service and 
knowing the weight of responsibility upon him will do his utmost to discard 
prejudice.”104 This view was echoed by barristers and judges I spoke with 
during my two weeks at the Old Bailey.105 
B.  THE PROCESS THEORY 
Another theory of juror bias is one that recognizes that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to detect individual juror bias (except in extreme cases) 
during voir dire, and that rather than trying to do so, we should recognize 
that the jury system includes institutional features that will ultimately 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Stand-bys allowed the Crown to reserve judgment on a prospective juror until all other 
prospective jurors were considered. See supra note 12.  
 102. See McEldowney, supra note 12, at 280–83. 
 103. Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trial by Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and 
American Criminal Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1345 (2007) (quoting DEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON 
JURY SERV., REPORT, 1965, Cmnd. 2627, ¶ 53). 
 104. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 49 (1986) (quoting Hans, V.P. 
(1983), unpublished data). 
 105. See Notes from the Old Bailey (Dec. 7–22, 2010) [hereinafter Notes from the Old 
Bailey] (unpublished notes) (on file with the author). A subsequent conversation with Judge 
Brian Barker confirmed this view. Interview with Judge Brian Barker, The Common Serjeant of 
London and Deputy Senior Judge at the Cent. Criminal Court, Old Bailey, London, in Chi., Ill. 
(Sept. 7, 2011). 
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produce an impartial jury. According to this theory, the voir dire, oath, 
instructions, diversity of the jury, and deliberations will ensure that an 
impartial jury decides the case. I have labeled this the “process theory” 
because it focuses on the process that jurors go through as they perform 
their role as jurors. Each of these institutional features imposes a constraint 
on jurors and helps to ensure that they will not follow their personal whims 
and biases and that they will ultimately serve as impartial jurors. The jury 
process is what leads them to behave as impartial jurors. 
According to the process theory, voir dire is important because it helps 
to transform a summoned citizen into a responsible juror. Even if the 
perfunctory questioning that takes place during voir dire does not enable 
lawyers to detect individual juror bias, it does help jurors to learn about their 
proper role.106 When potential jurors enter the courtroom, they often think 
about what they can say that will enable them to be excused from jury duty. 
However, once they sit in the jury box, respond to the judge’s questions, and 
learn about their fellow jurors, a transformation begins to take place. They 
are transformed from citizens who want to be excused into jurors who want 
to perform their role ably.107 Voir dire, then, is really the first of several steps 
where jurors begin to put aside their everyday concerns to assume the role 
of juror. For example, during voir dire and throughout the trial, jurors learn 
from the judge that they need to keep an open mind and to be impartial.108 
They also need to refrain from discussing the case, even with fellow jurors,109 
 
 106. On the weaknesses of a limited voir dire, see Babcock, supra note 64, at 549; Hans & 
Jehle, supra note 67, at 1201; Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 74, at 529. 
 107. For an individual account of this transformation, see Dan Hatfield, Jury Service an 
Engaging Adventure, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2004, at 34, 36 (“Surprisingly, that [excusal] was a 
bittersweet moment for me. I had gone from wanting to get out of this [jury service], to a 
heartfelt obligation to serve.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 37–38. 
 109. Some state courts, such as those in Arizona, have experimented with allowing jurors to 
discuss the case preliminarily before deliberations in civil jury trials as long as all of the jurors 
are present. See, e.g., B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79 
JUDICATURE 280, 281, 283 (1996). The idea behind this experiment is that it will help jurors to 
absorb what they have seen and heard in the courtroom. One difficulty is that jurors sometimes 
discuss the case even when all of the jurors are not present. See Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. 
Hans & G. Thomas Munsterman, Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona 
Reform, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359, 376 (2000) (finding that juries permitted to engage in 
preverdict deliberations did so without always waiting for all jurors to be present). One reason 
that other states have not followed suit is that they do not want jurors to form a fixed view of the 
case early in the trial, particularly before both sides have presented their evidence. But see ABA, 
PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES & JURY TRIALS princ. 13.F cmt. Subdivision F., at 103 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/ABA,
%20Principles%20for%20Juries%20and%20Jury%20Trials,%20Comments%20to%20Principl
es,%202005.pdf (“Recent empirical studies of structured juror discussions of the evidence 
during actual trials of civil cases found that allowing discussions did not lead to premature 
judgments in cases by jurors . . . .”).  
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until they begin their deliberations.110 Voir dire is the starting point in the 
education of jurors as to their proper role as impartial jurors.111 
The oath that citizens take before they officially become jurors is 
another institutional constraint on jurors that helps them to assume their 
role as impartial jurors. It signals to jurors that they are about to perform a 
duty that is out of the ordinary. They have to stand up in court, in the 
presence of the public, the parties, and the judge, and swear or affirm that 
they will perform their responsibilities as jurors to the best of their ability 
and that they will decide the case based only on the evidence presented in 
the courtroom.112 By taking an oath, they acknowledge before everyone in 
the courtroom and before whichever higher authority they believe in (if they 
believe in any) that they will do their utmost to abide by their oath. 
The judge’s instructions are another constraint on jurors that help 
them to keep an open mind and to be impartial.113 Typically, the judge 
reminds the jurors of this obligation throughout the trial. The judge will also 
remind the jurors that they can consider only the evidence presented in the 
courtroom.114 They are to decide the case based only on the facts as they 
find them and to apply the law as the judge instructs them on it.115 In 
addition, the judge will tell jurors not to discuss the case with anyone, and 
will repeat this admonition prior to any recess.116 Jurors try to follow the 
 
 110. For a preliminary instruction given by the judge during voir dire and throughout the 
trial, see ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 1.01 (2011 ed.) [hereinafter IPI].  
 111. Some preliminary education could take place when summoned citizens consult state 
court websites for jury information or watch the juror orientation video that some courthouses 
offer, but at that early stage, citizens might not pay close attention because they still hope to be 
excused from jury duty. 
 112. For example, the following oath is used in criminal trials in California: “You and each 
of you, do solemnly swear that you will well and truly try the cause now pending before this 
Court, and a true verdict render therein, according to the evidence and the instructions of the 
Court, so help you God?” CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL TRIAL JUDGES’ DESKBOOK 356 
(Ronald M. George ed., 1988 ed.).  
 113. Trial judges typically instruct jurors to keep an open mind until they have heard their 
fellow jurors’ views during the deliberations. For example, a trial judge in New York instructs 
jurors as follows: “Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after a fair and 
impartial consideration of the evidence with the other jurors.” N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D, Deliberations, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ 
cji/1-General/cjigc.html (select “Deliberation Procedures”). 
 114. See supra note 110 (citing IPI § 1.01). 
 115. A typical instruction is: “I instruct you that the law as given by the Court in these and 
other instructions constitute the only law for your guidance. It is your duty to accept and to 
follow the law as I give it to you even though you may disagree with the law.” 1A KEVIN F. 
O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 10.01, at 5 (5th ed. 2000). 
 116. For example, Judge Lance Ito admonished jurors throughout the state criminal trial of 
O.J. Simpson as follows: “Please remember all my admonitions to you; do not discuss the case 
amongst yourselves, form any opinions about the case . . . .” Transcript of Proceedings at 
47,792, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 686429 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1995). 
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judge’s instructions even if they are difficult to understand117 because jurors 
are laypeople and look up to the judge, who is an authority figure in the 
courtroom.118 
The deliberations also operate as a constraint on jurors and are a key 
element in ensuring that jurors maintain their impartiality. The 
deliberations are more likely to serve this function when the jury is diverse. 
When jurors come from different backgrounds, perspectives, and life 
experiences, they are likely to bring different ways of viewing the case into 
the deliberation room.119 During the deliberations, they engage in group 
discussion and try to reach a common understanding. Through this process, 
they can correct each other’s mistaken notions, broaden each other’s 
perspectives, and suggest different ways of looking at the evidence. A racially 
diverse jury allows jurors to challenge each other’s biases120 and can even 
lead white jurors to engage in a more thorough and careful deliberation 
than they would on a homogeneous jury by becoming more willing to 
discuss race-related issues.121 For a diverse jury to agree on a verdict means 
that the evidence was strong enough that jurors came to view the case in the 
same way even though they may have started out at very different points. 
One example, albeit fictional, of how jurors during jury deliberations 
can expose and challenge each other’s biases can be seen in the movie 12 
Angry Men.122 The defendant, a young man, was charged with the murder of 
his father; if found guilty, he would receive a mandatory death sentence. 
 
 117. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 454–58 (2006) (describing the findings of empirical studies showing 
that jurors have difficulty understanding jury instructions). 
 118. See, e.g., Note, Judges’ Nonverbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to Judicial Impartiality, 61 
VA. L. REV. 1266, 1278 (1975) (noting jurors’ tendency to look to the judge for guidance 
because they are uncertain how to perform their new role). 
 119. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 104, at 50 
(“[A] jury composed of individuals with a wide range of experiences, backgrounds, and 
knowledge is more likely to perceive the facts from different perspectives and thus engage in a 
vigorous and thorough debate.”). 
 120. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 104, at 50 (“The jury’s heterogeneous makeup may also 
lessen the power of prejudice.”).  
 121. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple 
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 605–06 
(2006) (describing the findings of an empirical study using mock jurors in which white jurors 
on racially diverse juries discussed more facts, made fewer inaccurate statements, and 
considered more race-related topics than white jurors on homogeneous juries); see also Samuel 
R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review 
of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1025 (2003) (“[M]embership on 
a racially heterogeneous jury might also influence White jurors’ behavior during 
deliberations.”); id. at 1028–29. 
 122. 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957). 
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During the deliberations, two jurors reveal their biases.123 Juror #3 (Lee J. 
Cobb) is prejudiced against the defendant because he has an estranged son 
who is the same age as the defendant. Juror #10 (Ed Begley) is prejudiced 
against the defendant because he is Puerto Rican, and Juror #10 believes 
that all Puerto Ricans are liars who fight amongst themselves and who do 
not think twice about killing each other.124 One of the most dramatic 
moments in the movie occurs when Juror #10 begins another tirade against 
Puerto Ricans, and one by one his fellow jurors stand up and turn away from 
him.125 Finally, he is left with just one juror, who tells him not to say another 
word. Juror #8 (Henry Fonda) lectures him (and the viewers) on the ways in 
which prejudice can impair judgment: “And no matter where you run into 
it, prejudice obscures the truth.”126 Juror #10 sits apart from the other jurors 
but now joins them in voting not guilty. 
After Juror #10’s ostracism and not-guilty vote, Juror #3 is the only juror 
still voting guilty. He attempts to remain a holdout, but soon succumbs to 
group pressure and to the realization that he voted guilty because of his 
feelings toward his son. He wants to punish his son by punishing the 
defendant. As Juror #8 observes in a rare display of anger: “Ever since we 
walked into this room you’ve been behaving like a self-appointed 
avenger. . . . You want to see this boy die because you personally want it, not 
because of the facts.”127 In a moment of recognition, Juror #3 tears a wallet-
size photo of himself and his son in half and changes his vote to not-guilty, 
thus, joining the other eleven jurors in rendering a unanimous verdict of 
not-guilty. 
Each of these features of the jury process—the voir dire, oath, 
instructions, and deliberations—helps to ensure that jurors will be impartial 
throughout the trial and will render a verdict that is fair and impartial. Even 
when individual jurors deviate from this norm, as two jurors did in 12 Angry 
Men, other jurors may challenge them during deliberations and expose their 
biases. Although jury deliberations are conducted in secret so that it is 
difficult to know whether this actually occurs, post-verdict interviews by 
jurors suggest that it does. Even when jurors disagree with each other, they 
usually describe their fellow jurors as having acted fairly, properly, and 
impartially.128 According to the process theory, the various features of the 
 
 123. Id. How these two jurors made it through voir dire without being removed for cause is 
never explained. However, voir dire, which was not shown in the film, would not have been in-
depth given the judge’s boredom with the case and the defense attorney’s indifference. 
 124. See REGINALD ROSE, TWELVE ANGRY MEN 180 (screenplay version of the film 12 ANGRY 
MEN, supra note 122) (“Now you’re not going to tell us that we’re supposed to believe that kid, 
knowing what he is. . . . I mean they’re born liars.” (quoting Juror #10)). 
 125. See id. at 312–16 (depicting Juror #10’s tirade and ostracism). 
 126. Id. at 316 (quoting Juror #8). 
 127. Id. at 273. 
 128. For example, the holdout juror in the first criminal trial of former Illinois Governor 
Rod Blagojevich was described by fellow jurors as having acted consistent with her sense of what 
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jury system help to ensure that jurors will be impartial throughout the trial 
and during the deliberations. Thus, even if lawyers and judges cannot easily 
detect juror bias during voir dire, several institutional features of the jury 
system can contain it. 
In my view, we should design jury selection based on the process theory 
of juror bias, though either the process theory or the English theory is 
preferable to the American theory. The American theory of juror bias 
assumes that lawyers and judges can detect individual bias during voir dire, 
even though empirical studies do not support this claim. This theory of bias 
excludes jurors from serving because lawyers have misgivings about them 
even though there is no reliable evidence that these jurors are biased. 
According to the English theory, it is assumed that all jurors can serve 
because they will rise to the occasion and perform their duties impartially. 
Although I share this assumption, I think the theory is incomplete. The 
process theory builds upon the English theory and recognizes that jurors will 
be constrained by various institutional features of the jury, such as the voir 
dire, oath, instructions, and deliberations, so that they will ultimately 
perform their role as impartial jurors. The jury process, with its various 
institutional constraints, will assist jurors to become impartial, even if they 
did not start out that way. Although the process theory and the English 
theory can overlap, the former recognizes the importance of several of the 
jury features and seeks to preserve them because of the vital role they play in 
transforming summoned citizens into impartial jurors. 
IV.  DESIGNING JURY SELECTION ACCORDING TO THE PROCESS THEORY OF 
JUROR BIAS 
According to the process theory and the English theory of juror bias, 
there is no role for peremptory challenges. According to both theories, 
lawyers should not try to uncover subtle juror bias during voir dire as they do 
under the current American theory of juror bias. Not only are lawyers ill-
equipped to do so, as empirical studies suggest, but also impartial jurors can 
be obtained through other means. The English theory recognizes that 
peremptories are not necessary because jurors, for the most part, will rise to 
 
the evidence showed and what the prosecution had failed to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Even though the other jurors were frustrated that the jury was a hung jury on all counts 
but one, they believed that the holdout juror had acted properly throughout the deliberations. 
See, e.g., Annie Sweeney et al., Many Blagojevich Jurors Disappointed, Foreman Cites ‘Lack of a Smoking 
Gun’, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-08-18/news/ct-met-
blagojevich-verdict-jury-20100818_1_female-juror-deliberation-senate-seat (“‘We deliberated 
logically and with respect for each other’s opinions,’ [jury foreperson James] Matsumoto said. 
Still, he added, ‘it was very frustrating.’”). Of course, there are exceptions, such as the holdout 
juror in United States v. Thomas, whose behavior raised questions among several jurors. United 
States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 609–11 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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the occasion and perform their role impartially.129 The process theory 
recognizes that even if jurors do not begin as impartial jurors, they will be 
taught along the way by the jury process, and by the time they deliberate, 
they will deliberate impartially. 
Under either of these theories, the peremptory plays no role, and 
therefore, should be eliminated. Its elimination would improve the jury 
process in several significant ways. No longer would there be the charade of 
disingenuous reasons to explain peremptories whenever they are challenged 
under Batson. Nor would there be the skewing of otherwise diverse juries 
through the exercise of discriminatory peremptories, particularly in capital 
cases, where this pattern is pronounced.130 Moreover, the skewing of 
otherwise diverse juries interferes with the role that deliberations play in 
enabling jurors to challenge each other’s views in order to arrive at a verdict 
that has been tested rather than blithely accepted. 
The elimination of peremptory challenges does not necessarily mean 
the elimination of for-cause challenges or voir dire.131 In my view, voir dire 
should remain because it serves other useful, though rarely acknowledged, 
purposes, such as helping jurors learn about the role of the juror and the 
need for juror impartiality. For-cause challenges should also remain because 
they address the clear-cut cases in which everyone acknowledges a biased 
juror, oftentimes including the biased juror. 
A.  ELIMINATING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
If lawyers and judges cannot detect subtle juror bias during voir dire, 
then peremptory challenges cease to fulfill their purpose. The main 
function of the peremptory is to allow lawyers to remove those jurors whom 
they think will not be impartial, even though these jurors have not been 
eliminated for cause.132 
The elimination of the peremptory would improve the jury process in 
several significant ways. First, the Batson framework, which allows 
peremptories, but not if they are based on race, gender, or ethnicity, leads 
to a charade in which lawyers give all kinds of “silly” or fanciful reasons,133 
and judges tend to accept them as long as they are not the forbidden 
 
 129. This theory finds support in the work of Kadish and Kadish, who focused on the 
importance of roles and how they are exercised. MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, 
DISCRETION TO DISOBEY (1973). They looked at prosecutors, police officers, judges, and jurors, 
id. at 45–91, who exercise “recourse roles.” Id. at 35. These roles are clearly defined, but also 
entail the exercise of some discretion. Id. at 34–36. For example, jurors for the most part follow 
the judge’s instructions, “[b]ut the obligation is not absolute.” Id. at 66. Occasionally, when the 
situation demands, “the jury may justifiably depart from the rule requiring it to defer to the 
judge’s instructions.” Id. 
 130. See EJI REPORT, supra note 14, at 5, 14. 
 131. See Marder, supra note 13, at 555–56. 
 132. See, e.g., KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 61, at 50. 
 133. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam). 
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reasons. This allows us to pay lip service to nondiscrimination during jury 
selection even though lawyers might well be exercising discriminatory 
peremptories. They might be unaware of their own prejudices, or they might 
be aware of them and simply offer disingenuous reasons in order to mask 
them.134 In either case, the effect is deleterious to the jury. Superficial or 
disingenuous reasons undermine the integrity of jury selection and can lead 
to cynicism about the entire trial.135 When a defendant hears that a juror has 
been excluded because the juror is wearing a green shirt, and the judge 
permits the peremptory because the reason is race neutral and the appellate 
court subsequently affirms, the defendant might lose faith in the jury system. 
Second, the elimination of the peremptory would lead to more diverse 
juries. Lawyers exercise their peremptories to remove jurors based on race, 
gender, and ethnicity, even if they do not acknowledge this when required 
to give reasons. Even though the venire might have been drawn from a fair 
cross section of the community, and the first twelve names for the petit jury 
randomly drawn, lawyers can still use peremptories to undermine the 
diversity of the jury. The effect becomes particularly pronounced in capital 
cases.136 “Death qualification”137 can have a disproportionate effect on 
African Americans,138 and prosecutors can use their generous allotment of 
peremptories to remove the few remaining African Americans left on a 
capital jury. As a result, African American defendants in capital cases can 
end up being tried by juries from which all remaining African Americans 
have been excluded.139 
When peremptories are exercised on the basis of race, gender, and 
ethnicity, the parties lose out on the benefits of a diverse jury. When jurors 
are drawn from different walks of life, they are likely to bring different 
perspectives and life experiences to their decision-making. When these 
jurors are removed through peremptories, their perspectives are lost to the 
 
 134. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“A 
prosecutor’s own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a 
prospective black juror is ‘sullen,’ or ‘distant,’ a characterization that would not have come to 
his mind if a white juror had acted identically.”). 
 135. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991) (observing that discriminatory 
peremptories “invite[] cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation to adhere to 
the law”). 
 136. See EJI REPORT, supra note 14, at 5, 14. 
 137. A “death-qualified” jury is one in which those potential jurors who say they could not 
vote for the death penalty are excluded from the jury. The Supreme Court has held that death 
qualification does not violate the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. 
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167–68, 174–76 (1986). 
 138. See, e.g., Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death 
Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46 (1984) (finding that death-
qualified juries are more likely to exclude women and African Americans). 
 139. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 235–45 (2005). 
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group.140 As the jury becomes more homogeneous, it loses jurors who might 
have remembered different pieces of evidence, corrected mistaken 
recollections, or simply viewed the evidence in a different light so that the 
jury can reach an accurate verdict.141 In other words, the exclusion of these 
jurors means that neither the parties nor the jury derives the full benefits of 
group decision-making,142 and the deliberations do not include jurors who 
can challenge each other’s biases and insist upon an impartial deliberation. 
Finally, the elimination of the peremptory would also benefit the 
excluded juror. Although jurors are told that lawyers can exercise 
peremptories, and that they should not take it personally,143 it can still be 
demoralizing for jurors when they are excluded. They might well conclude 
that they were excluded for an impermissible reason.144 If the few remaining 
African American jurors are excluded through peremptory challenges, it is 
clear to everyone in the courtroom that they were removed because of their 
race, even if that reason is never stated in open court. In addition, the 
excluded jurors miss the opportunity to be seen as full citizens. Jury duty and 
voting are the two badges of citizenship. When jurors are excluded from the 
jury, they feel like second-class citizens.145 There is also the lost educational 
opportunity. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted, the jury serves as a “free 
school,” educating citizens not just on the law but also on the responsibilities 
of self-governance in a democracy.146 
Thus, peremptories, even as modified under Batson, produce a number 
of harms that can be eliminated only if peremptories are eliminated. If 
 
 140. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion) 
(“When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the 
effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human 
experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232–44 (1978). 
 142. A more homogeneous jury is likely to lead to “group-think,” in which jurors are 
unwilling to question and challenge each other; instead, they simply conform to the prevalent 
view. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 7, 270–71 (2d ed. 1983). 
 143. See Mary R. Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to Jurors’ Views Regarding the Peremptory 
Challenge, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1061, 1097 (2003) (“Jurors seemed to realize that jury selection 
is only partly about them.”). 
 144. According to Mr. Cox, an African American prospective juror who was challenged by 
defense counsel in a civil case that later settled: “I was excused seemingly just because my skin 
was black. There was no other reason why I should have been challenged. I was very irritated 
and extremely disappointed that such a practice should be allowed.” Dale W. Broeder, The Negro 
in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). The EJI Report 
documented more recent examples of citizens who were “excluded from participation in civic 
life on account of their race,” and who suffered “humiliation and denigration.” EJI REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 47. One excluded juror “grew emotional as he recalled how the prosecutor’s 
racist actions made him feel unworthy” nearly twenty years after the experience. Id. at 30. 
 145. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 146. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 252 (J. P. Mayer & Max Lerner 
eds., Harper & Row 1966) (1835). 
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peremptories are eliminated, that does not mean that voir dire and for-cause 
challenges must be eliminated too; they still have key roles to play. 
B.  PRESERVING FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGES 
Although the process view of juror bias would lead to the elimination of 
the peremptory challenge, it would not lead to the elimination of the for-
cause challenge. One difference between the for-cause challenge and the 
peremptory is that the for-cause challenge requires a reason in every 
instance, and the judge must agree to the reason. Another difference is that 
the for-cause challenge, though left to the judge’s discretion, is appropriate 
only in a limited number of circumstances. It is typically exercised when the 
prospective juror has a familial relationship to one of the participants in the 
trial, when the prospective juror has a financial stake in the outcome of the 
case, or when the prospective juror says that he or she cannot be 
impartial.147 Each of these instances presents a fairly clear-cut case when the 
juror cannot be impartial or satisfy the appearance of impartiality. Even the 
English theory of juror bias recognizes these instances; moreover, these 
instances do not require a searching inquiry to reveal. 
In these few instances, it is important to have a mechanism to remove 
the prospective juror; otherwise, the parties will have doubts from the outset 
as to whether the jury can be impartial. The for-cause challenge provides 
such a mechanism, and it is flexible enough to encompass additional 
categories should they become necessary when the peremptory is 
eliminated.148 The for-cause challenge, however, will not morph into the 
peremptory challenge as long as it is limited to a few agreed-upon 
categories, requires reasons that are given in open court, and remains a 
decision that the judge makes on the record. 
C.  MAINTAINING VOIR DIRE 
Even if peremptories are eliminated, voir dire should be preserved 
because it serves other purposes that are important to the process theory of 
juror bias. Ostensibly, voir dire provides lawyers with information about 
jurors so that they can exercise their peremptories wisely rather than based 
on stereotype or hunch. However, as voir dire has become more 
perfunctory, the limited information gleaned from the process has become 
less useful. Lawyers are left to their own devices and resort to stereotypes 
and hunches in the exercise of their peremptories.149 If that were the only 
purpose of voir dire—to provide information for the exercise of 
 
 147. See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887). 
 148. See Marder, Beyond Gender, supra note 9, at 1107.  
 149. See Kerr et al., supra note 72, at 699 (“Those charged with making juror selection 
decisions receive little formal training for the task. What little training is provided is largely 
anecdotal or based on folklore or stereotypes.”). 
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peremptories—then the elimination of peremptories would lead to the 
elimination of voir dire. However, voir dire serves other purposes and 
should be maintained, albeit in a more focused and abbreviated form. 
Voir dire begins the process of teaching jurors about their proper role 
and helping them to make the transition from citizens to jurors. The 
elimination of peremptories would not alter this critical, though seldom 
recognized, purpose of voir dire. Without peremptories, though, voir dire 
could be shortened. It could begin with jurors taking their seat in the jury 
box and the judge introducing them to the case. The judge would still need 
to ask some basic questions, but these would mainly help the jurors, judge, 
and lawyers figure out if any jurors needed to be removed for cause. These 
questions could include: “Do any of you know the parties?” and “Do any of 
you have any connection to this case?” Though basic, they would be 
sufficient to reveal whether any of the jurors needed to be removed for 
cause. Without peremptories, there will be no need for the silly or intrusive 
questions that lawyers sometimes ask, such as: “What baseball team do you 
root for?”150 Instead, the judge will be able to spend time explaining to the 
jurors how the trial will proceed, the role they will play, how their role differs 
from that of the judge, and why their role is so important to the judicial 
system. 
By using voir dire to teach jurors about their role and to impress upon 
them the importance of juror impartiality, jurors will begin the trial with 
much better preparation than they now have so that they understand what is 
about to take place in the courtroom and what they will be asked to do later 
in the jury room. Such an approach to voir dire will allow it to fulfill its 
function according to the process theory of juror bias, which is to help jurors 
understand the need to keep an open mind throughout the trial and until 
they reach a verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of Batson, it is a fitting moment to look 
back and see how Batson has fared. In my view, it has not fared well. It is time 
to recognize that the Batson experiment has failed. It has led to a charade in 
which lawyers give reasons to explain their peremptories but the reasons are 
not real, and the subterfuge undermines the integrity of the jury system. It is 
time to stop the charade. 
The root of the problem is not Batson, but our theory of juror bias. 
According to the American theory, we assume that lawyers and judges can 
discern which jurors are biased, even though empirical studies find no 
support for this claim. Because we assume lawyers can detect bias, we assume 
that they can use peremptories to remove biased jurors, but they cannot. We 
need to replace this theory with one that is more realistic, especially because 
 
 150. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 61, at 53. 
A8_MARDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2012  7:32 PM 
1612 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1585 
peremptories cause a number of harms. For example, they allow lawyers to 
skew the composition of the jury so that juries are less diverse than they 
would otherwise be. Venires are drawn from a fair cross section of the 
community, and individual jurors are randomly selected for the petit jury, 
but then lawyers’ peremptories, exercised on the basis of race, gender, or 
ethnicity, undermine the diversity of the jury. These abuses reach their 
zenith in capital cases, in which the number of peremptories is high and the 
stakes are huge. 
There are alternative theories of juror bias; the American theory is not 
the only one. The English theory suggests that jurors can rise to the 
occasion, put aside personal prejudices, and be impartial so there is no need 
for peremptories or an extensive voir dire. The process theory suggests that 
jurors will be constrained by institutional features of the jury so that they will 
learn to be impartial jurors and this lesson will be reinforced at various 
junctures throughout the trial, including the voir dire, oath, instructions, 
and deliberations. Thus, there is no need for peremptories because the jury 
process will ensure impartial jurors. Either of these theories leads to the 
elimination of the peremptory, though I think the process theory is more 
complete. According to either theory, there remains a role for the for-cause 
challenge and an abbreviated voir dire. With a new theory of juror bias, it 
becomes clear that our practices, including peremptory challenges, need to 
change. Justice Marshall foresaw this change twenty-five years ago. He 
proposed the elimination of the peremptory, and he was right. We have now 
had twenty-five years of experience with Batson and it is time to heed Justice 
Marshall’s advice. 
 
